A new world : the geopolitics of the energy transformation by Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, The secretariat of the & Van de Graaf, Thijs

A New World 
The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Global 
Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation and do not neces-
sarily represent the views of IRENA or its member states.
www.geopoliticsofrenewables.org
This Report may be freely reproduced, in whole or in part, provided the original 
source is acknowledged.
With the support of
© IRENA 2019       ISBN 978-92-9260-097-6
Contents
The Commission .................................................................................................................2
Foreword by Adnan Z. Amin, Director-General of IRENA  ...................................6
Foreword by Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson, Chair of the Commission  ....................8
Introduction  ....................................................................................................................12
The global energy transformation  .......................................................................14
Energy transformation  .............................................................................................. 15
The forces of change  ................................................................................................ 18
Why renewables will transform geopolitics  ..................................................... 23
Redrawing the geopolitical map  ...........................................................................26
Power shifts  .................................................................................................................. 26
New relations between states  ............................................................................... 45
Energy and conflict  .................................................................................................... 55
Addressing root causes of geopolitical instability  .....................................62
Economic and social tensions ............................................................................... 63
Climate, water and food security .......................................................................... 65
A new development path ......................................................................................... 67
Conclusion  .......................................................................................................................72
Endnotes ............................................................................................................................. 76
Abbreviations  .................................................................................................................... 84
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 86
Photographic credits  ..................................................................................................... 88

A New World  2
The Commission
Aware that the growing deployment of renewables has set in motion a global 
energy transformation with significant implications for geopolitics, Adnan Z. 
Amin, the Director-General of the International Renewable Energy Agency 
(IRENA), with the support of the Governments of Germany, Norway and the 
United Arab Emirates, convened the Global Commission in January 2018. 
Chaired by former President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson of Iceland, the 
Commission comprises a diverse group of distinguished leaders from the 
worlds of politics, energy, economics, trade, environment and development. 
The Commission is an independent body with members serving in their in-
dividual capacity.
This Report analyzes the geopolitical implications of the global energy 
transformation driven by renewables. It is the culmination of ten months’ 
deliberations by the Commission, involving four meetings held in Berlin, Oslo, 
Reykjavik and Abu Dhabi respectively, as well as consultations with business 
leaders, academics and policy thinkers. It is informed by a number of 
background papers drafted by experts in the fields of energy, security and 
geopolitics.
The Commission takes full and independent responsibility for this Report, 
which reflects the consensus of its members.
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Foreword by Adnan Z. Amin,  
Director-General of IRENA 
Energy is fundamental to our civilization and to the prosperity of nations. Its 
production, distribution and utilization are deeply embedded in the fabric of 
our economies and central to the relations between states. 
The energy sources powering our societies have been undergoing a period 
of rapid change. Renewables have emerged as a technologically feasible, 
economically attractive and sustainable choice that increasingly can meet 
the energy needs of many countries, corporations and citizens. As tackling 
climate change becomes more and more critical and renewables steadily 
increase their capacity to meet our energy needs, the global transition to 
sustainable sources of energy will continue to accelerate. 
Renewables enable countries to strengthen their energy security and achieve 
greater energy independence by harnessing the vast indigenous renewable 
energy sources that can be found across the planet. The rapid development 
of renewable technologies and their widespread deployment is certain to 
have significant long-term effects on geopolitical dynamics. While the estab-
lishment of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) has created 
a central platform for international cooperation on renewables, to date no 
systematic efforts have been made to examine their geopolitical implications 
comprehensively.
I therefore took the initiative to convene a Global Commission to address the 
geopolitics of energy transformation. Composed of prominent leaders from 
different geographical and professional backgrounds in the fields of energy 
and international affairs, the Commission was launched at IRENA’s annual 
Assembly in January 2018 and deliberated over one year, drawing on the 
views of a broad range of public and private stakeholders and academics.
I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to all who contributed to this 
process. Germany, Norway and the United Arab Emirates provided generous 
support that made the work of the Commission possible. President Grimsson, 
as Chair, ably guided the Commission’s deliberations. 
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Commission members made time to actively participate in the Commission’s 
discussions and provide compelling perspectives from their various areas of 
expertise. Last, but not least, the small but highly competent Secretariat 
facilitated, supported and synthesized the Commission’s reflections and 
research. 
The Report that has resulted is a vital first foray in this area that deepens our 
understanding of the wider geopolitical implications of the energy transfor-
mation. It invites us to rethink energy statecraft as we have known it. It maps 
trends in the energy sector, and considers their possible impacts on power 
relations, trade, the root causes of geopolitical instability, and conflict. The 
report also acknowledges that, given the complex and dynamic nature of the 
transition, it is difficult to predict precisely how events will unfold.
The Report highlights the vital need to prepare proactively for the new energy 
age and its geopolitical consequences. It also shows the crucial need to 
encourage innovation, align socio-economic structures and investment with 
the energy transition, strengthen international co-operation, and plan energy 
systems that are just and inclusive. Forward-looking choices that leaders in 
government and industry make today will create a more prosperous future 
that globally can promote sustainable economic growth, improve livelihoods, 
and foster social cohesion and stability.
It is my hope that this Report will help decision makers in countries to anticipate 
and navigate the rapidly changing global energy landscape and manage the 
new geopolitical environment it will create. In doing so, this Report can enable 
them to mitigate the potential risks and benefit from the many opportunities 
that transformation offers. 
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Foreword by Ólafur Ragnar 
Grimsson, Chair of the 
Commission 
In recent years we have witnessed a transformation of the global energy 
system that has helped to configure the geopolitical map of the world which 
has prevailed for decades. 
The shift from fossil fuels to renewables is driven by new technologies and 
falling costs, increasingly making renewables as competitive as conventional 
sources of energy. The energy transformation is also driven by the policies 
and actions of governments, businesses, cities and civil society, as well as 
the world-wide movement to combat climate change and dangerous air 
pollution.
This global energy transformation is already becoming a major geopolitical 
force: changing the power structures of regions and states, bringing the 
promise of energy independence to nations and communities, enhancing 
energy security and democratic empowerment.
It was to understand and analyze this new, emerging geopolitical reality that 
the visionary Director-General of IRENA, Adnan Z. Amin, proposed to the 
Assembly of more than 150 Member States, the creation of an independent 
Global Commission to deliver a Report on the geopolitical consequences of 
the global energy transformation.
It has been an honour and a privilege to serve as the Chair of the Commission 
and to conduct the informed dialogue of a group of distinguished and expe-
rienced individuals who brought a wealth of insights and knowledge to our 
collective enterprise. 
This Report is the first attempt to describe the new geopolitical world that is 
emerging from the renewables revolution. It is therefore both historic and 
worthy of further debate and analysis.
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It is our hope that the Report will help people in government and business, 
universities, think tanks, civil society organizations and the media, as well as 
citizens across the world, to understand better and adjust to the geopolitical 
changes now gathering pace. 
I wish to thank the Members of the Commission for their dedication and 
co-operation and the capable Secretariat, supported by IRENA, for its excellent 
work. We also benefited from various contributions by business leaders and 
experts who addressed the Commission. The support provided by the 
Governments of Germany, Norway and the United Arab Emirates was also 
critical to the success of our work.
In this endeavour, I have been guided by the experience of my own country 
which, during my lifetime, has moved from primary dependence on fossil 
fuels to become one of the most successful renewable energy countries in 
the world - bringing prosperity to the people and serving as a foundation for 
constructive political relationships with countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and 
the Americas.
Through my service as President of Iceland, I was able to witness first hand 
how success in renewables can lead to new and dynamic partnerships between 
countries, thereby creating lasting alliances and fresh opportunities between 
nations that were once far apart.
My responsibility as the Chair of the Global Commission thus allowed me to 
see in the history of my own country a prelude to a New World. 


Introduction  
Fundamental changes are taking place in the global energy system which 
will affect almost all countries and will have wide-ranging geopolitical conse-
quences. Renewables have moved to the centre of the global energy landscape. 
Technological advances and falling costs have made renewables grow faster 
than any other energy source. Many renewable technologies are now cost- 
competitive with fossil fuels in the power sector, even before taking into account 
their contributions to the battles against air pollution and climate change. 
These trends are creating an irreversible momentum for a global energy 
transformation. While the surge in wind, solar and other renewables has taken 
place mostly in the electricity sector, new technologies are enabling this 
transformation in other sectors. Electric vehicles and heat pumps are extending 
the deployment of renewables in transport, industry and buildings. Innovations 
in digitalization and energy storage are expanding the potential for renewables 
to flourish in ways that were unimaginable just a decade ago. 
The accelerating deployment of renewables has set in motion a global energy 
transformation that will have profound geopolitical consequences. Just as 
fossil fuels have shaped the geopolitical map over the last two centuries, the 
energy transformation will alter the global distribution of power, relations 
between states, the risk of conflict, and the social, economic and environmental 
drivers of geopolitical instability. 
These far-reaching effects have not previously been considered in a compre-
hensive manner in any international forum or setting. To raise awareness and 
deepen understanding of them, IRENA established the Global Commission 
on the Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation, with the support of the 
Governments of Germany, Norway and the United Arab Emirates.

PA R T  1 . 
The global energy 
transformation  
Renewable sources of energy—particularly wind and solar—have grown at 
an unprecedented rate in the last decade and have consistently surpassed 
expectations. The growth of their deployment in the power sector has already 
outpaced that of any other energy source, including fossil fuels, which include 
oil, coal and natural gas. Renewables, in combination with energy efficiency, 
now form the leading edge of a far-reaching global energy transition.1
This ongoing transition to renewables is not just a shift from one set of fuels 
to another. It involves a much deeper transformation of the world’s energy 
systems that will have major social, economic and political implications which 
go well beyond the energy sector. The term ‘energy transformation’ captures 
these broader implications.2
The global energy transformation will have a particularly pronounced impact 
on geopolitics. It is one of the undercurrents of change that will help to redraw 
the geopolitical map of the 21st century. The new geopolitical reality that is 
taking shape will be fundamentally different from the conventional map of 
energy geopolitics that has been dominant for more than one hundred years. 
Fossil fuels have been the foundation of the global energy system, economic 
growth and modern lifestyles. The exploitation of fossil fuels lifted global 
energy use fifty-fold in the last two centuries, shaping the geopolitical envi-
ronment of the modern world. The geographic concentration of fossil fuels 
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has had a significant impact on the wealth and security of nations. An energy 
transformation driven by renewables could bring changes just as radical in 
their scope and impact.
The majority of countries can hope to increase their energy independence 
significantly, and fewer economies will be at risk from vulnerable energy supply 
lines and volatile prices. Some countries that are heavily dependent on exports 
of oil, gas or coal will need to adapt to avoid serious economic consequences. 
Many developing economies will have the possibility to leapfrog fossil fuel-
based systems and centralized grids. Renewables will also be a powerful 
vehicle of democratization because they make it possible to decentralize the 
energy supply, empowering citizens, local communities, and cities.
Energy transformation
Rapidly growing renewables have unquestionably started to transform the 
global energy landscape in an irreversible way. At the same time, considerable 
uncertainty still surrounds the energy transition that is taking place. As the 
rapid uptake in renewables shows, we live in an age of exponential change 
and disruption. Which technological innovations will accelerate the transfor-
mation cannot yet be foreseen. Political choices will affect the course and 
pace of the energy transformation, which is likely to progress at different 
speeds in each country and in each sector. However, three primary aspects 
characterize and underpin the transition: energy efficiency, the growth of 
renewables, and electrification. 
Energy efficiency enables economic growth with lower energy inputs. In the 
twentieth century, the average growth rate of energy demand was 3%, about 
the same as the growth rate of global GDP. In recent decades, improvements 
in energy efficiency have broken this link. Primary energy demand is now 
forecast to grow at 1% a year in the period to 2040.3
Growth of renewables. Renewables have emerged as the fastest growing 
energy source.4 The main renewable energy sources are bioenergy, geothermal, 
hydropower, ocean, solar and wind. Among these, solar energy and wind 
power are undergoing very rapid growth, while the others are growing more 
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gradually. Solar and wind share a characteristic that is largely unique to them: 
the amount of power they generate varies with the weather and the time of 
day. This is why they are called variable renewable energy sources. 
The impact of the extraordinary growth in renewables has mostly been felt 
in the electricity sector. Since 2012, renewables have added more new power 
generation capacity than conventional sources of energy.5 Solar power added 
more new capacity in 2017 than did coal, gas, and nuclear plants combined.6 
Wind and solar now provide 6% of electricity generation worldwide, up from 
0.2% in 2000. In the aggregate, renewables account for around a quarter of 
global electricity generation.7
Countries such as Denmark already generate more than half their electricity 
from variable renewable energy sources.8 In 2017, Costa Rica’s electricity 
was generated entirely from renewable energy for 300 days. For several days 
in the past year, the power systems of Germany, Portugal and Denmark were 
able to run entirely on renewables.
Electrification. Electricity accounts for 19% of total final energy consumption, 
but its share is expected to grow as increased electrification of end-use sectors 
takes place.9 The deployment of heat pumps and electric vehicles, for example, 
permits electricity to be used for heating, cooling, and transport. Electricity 
has been the fastest growing segment of final energy demand, growing two-
thirds faster than energy consumption as a whole since 2000. This trend is 
set to continue. Since 2016, the power sector has attracted more investment 
than the upstream oil and gas sectors that have traditionally dominated energy 
investment, another reflection of the ongoing electrification of the world’s 
economy.10
The speed of the energy transformation is uncertain. Because of the complexity 
of energy systems, there are as many scenarios on the future of energy as 
there are forecasters. Nevertheless, scenarios that model an energy future 
compatible with the goals of the Paris Agreement have a similar structure: a 
near-term peak in fossil fuel demand, a rapid uptake of renewables, and a 
long decline in fossil fuel demand.11 Figure 1 illustrates these dynamics. It is 
not a prediction, but shows a possible pathway which assumes that the world 
is able to achieve the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit temperature increase 
to ‘well below 2°C’. 
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Figure 1. The energy transition framework
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Note: This data is taken from the Shell Sky Scenario (2018), which has the merit of forecasting 
to 2100 and therefore projects the nature of the energy transformation over the course of the 
century. Other energy transition scenarios usually have shorter time horizons. The Sustainable 
Development Scenario (SDS) of the International Energy Agency (IEA), for example, only looks 
forward to 2040. IRENA’s REmap scenario goes to 2050. Shell’s forecast share of renewables 
and fossil fuels is similar to that of the IEA SDS scenario for 2040 as well as the DNV GL and 
Equinor Renewal scenarios for 2050. The IPCC 1.5 degree median scenario and IRENA REmap 
scenario anticipate a substantially larger share of renewables by 2050 with an earlier peak in 
fossil fuel demand. 
Source: Shell Sky Scenario, 2018.
Even though nuclear energy is a low-carbon technology, the growth prospects 
for nuclear energy seem limited. After rapid expansion in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the growth of nuclear power has slowed in the last three decades. The share 
of nuclear in electricity generation declined from 17% in 2000 to 10% in 2017.12 
Around two thirds of today’s nuclear power plants in advanced economies 
are more than 30 years old and will be shut down in the foreseeable future 
unless their lifetimes are extended.13 Some countries are building new nuclear 
power plants, notably China, India, Russia, and the UAE. In others, governments 
are planning to phase out nuclear power, as in Germany, Switzerland, Spain 
and South Korea. 
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Overall, the global energy transformation is characterized primarily by a rapid 
growth of renewables, and in particular solar and wind. Oil, gas and coal will 
be affected differently by the energy transition because they have distinct 
characteristics and are used in a variety of sectors.
The forces of change
Six enabling trends drive the rapid deployment of renewables.
I. Declining cost
As the costs of renewable energy technologies have fallen, the business case 
for renewable energy has become a major driver of change. Mature renewable 
energy technologies, including hydropower and geothermal, have been 
cost-competitive for years where they operate. However, technologies such 
as solar and wind have also gained a competitive edge as a result of techno-
logical advances and increased investment. The steep decline in costs of 
renewable energy and energy storage has surprised even the most optimistic 
observers. Once dismissed as too expensive to expand beyond niche markets, 
solar and wind can now beat conventional generation technologies on cost 
in many of the world’s top markets, even without subsidies.14 
Since 2010, the average cost of electricity from solar PV and wind energy has 
fallen by 73% and 22% respectively.15 In countries as dissimilar as Chile and 
Saudi Arabia, India and the United States, electricity is being produced in 
optimal locations for around 30 US dollars per megawatt hour (MWh). Auction 
prices suggest that by 2020 the average cost of electricity that is generated 
by solar and wind sources will be at the lower end of fossil fuel electricity 
costs.16 The cost of lithium-ion batteries, which are used in electric vehicles, 
has fallen by 80% since 2010.17 As a result of these cost declines, investments 
in renewable technologies are increasingly driven by competitive business 
models and the profit motive.
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Significant cost declines are expected to continue over the course of the next 
decade. IRENA estimates that by 2025 the global weighted average cost of 
electricity could fall by 26% from onshore wind, by 35% from offshore wind, 
by at least 37% from concentrated solar power (CSP) technologies, and by 
59% from solar photovoltaics (PV).18 The cost of stationary battery storage 
could fall by up to 60%,19 and there is growing confidence that electric and 
conventional vehicles will be sold at comparable prices by the mid-2020s.20
II. Pollution and climate change
The problems caused by fossil fuels—including widespread air pollution and 
climate change—have led governments, businesses, investors and the public 
to recognize the need to decarbonize the global economy. Pollution, mainly 
caused by the burning of oil and coal, is making the air dangerous to breathe 
in many cities, from New Delhi to Beijing and Paris. The World Health 
Organization estimates that nine out of every ten people in the world breathe 
polluted air that is hazardous to health and wellbeing, and that air pollution 
kills 7 million people every year,21 making it the fourth largest cause of death.
Climate change poses an existential threat to humanity and the Earth’s 
eco-systems. Unless urgent steps are taken to decarbonize the energy sector, 
the world will not achieve the Paris Agreement’s goal to hold “the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels”. A recent IPCC report sets out increasingly persuasive 
scientific evidence of the need to limit the temperature rise to a maximum of 
1.5°C to prevent long-lasting or irreversible changes, including the loss of 
vital ecosystems.22 At present, the world is on a course that, relative to pre- 
industrial levels, will increase global temperatures by at least 3°C by the end 
of the century.23 Another recent scientific study has warned that an abrupt 
domino effect may tip the planet into a ‘hothouse’ state if global temperatures 
rise by more than 2°C.24 
Most pathways to a low-carbon economy would require the rapid deployment 
of renewable energy and a doubling of energy efficiency, given that the energy 
sector accounts for two-thirds of global emissions.25 An analysis by IRENA 
has shown that deployment of renewable energy combined with improved 
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energy efficiency provides the most cost-effective way to achieve the 90% 
reduction in energy-related emissions that is required to meet the Paris 
Agreement target.26 The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted 
by world leaders at the United Nations in September 2015, contain a specific 
goal on energy, which aims to provide universal access to modern energy 
services, double the rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and increase 
substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030. 
III. Renewable energy targets
Influenced by the strengthened business case of renewables and the need 
to decarbonize the energy sector, numerous governments have raised their 
ambitions and taken steps to accelerate their deployment of renewable energy. 
So far, 57 countries have developed plans to decarbonize their electricity 
sector completely, and 179 have set national or state renewable energy targets.27 
Governments initially supported renewables through subsidies and mandates, 
but they are increasingly moving to competitive auctions that are delivering 
lower prices.28 
Many countries are shifting to renewables because they lack oil and gas 
reserves and wish to be less dependent on energy imports. India, for example, 
is set to become ever more dependent on costly energy imports unless it 
changes course.29 This is one reason why it has adopted ambitious renewable 
energy targets. 
A number of major oil-producing countries are also setting targets for in-
creasing the proportion of renewables in their energy mix. The United Arab 
Emirates’ energy strategy, for example, sets an objective of 44% of renewables 
in its power supply and a 70% reduction in its carbon emissions by 2050. 
Russia auctioned 2 GW of renewables in 2017 and is planning to auction 
another 1 GW in 2018.
In certain countries, where central governments have been slow to establish 
renewable energy targets, local governments and municipalities have acted 
in their place. California has adopted a 60% renewable electricity target by 
2030, and several cities, from Mexico City to Madrid, have announced plans 
to ban diesel cars. 
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IV. Technological innovation
Technological innovations, including higher solar photovoltaic (PV) module 
efficiencies and taller wind turbines, have played an important role in accel-
erating the deployment of renewables in the electricity sector. Patenting rates 
suggest that more technological innovation has taken place in the field of 
clean energy technologies than in traditional energy fields such as fossil fuels 
and nuclear.30 In the long term, next generation biofuels and renewable hy-
drogen generated from electrolysis may permit renewables to extend into a 
growing range of hard-to-electrify sectors, such as aviation, shipping and 
heavy industry.31 
Innovations in digitalization and energy storage are also opening up new 
frontiers. New digital technologies, such as smart grids, the internet of things, 
big data, and artificial intelligence, are being applied in the energy industry, 
helping to raise its efficiency and accelerate the use of renewable energy 
within emerging smart generation and distribution systems. 
New energy technologies are also being developed for energy storage, vital 
for variable renewables such as wind and solar. Batteries, including those in 
electric vehicles, are expected to become an important storage technology. 
Electricity can also be stored in thermal form using boilers, heat pumps or 
chilled water. For longer-term storage, there are other options, including 
compressed air energy storage or hydrogen.
V. Corporate and investor action
The actions of corporations are also driving change. Investor groups such as 
DivestInvest and CA100+32 are putting pressure on companies to reduce their 
carbon footprints. At the December 2018 climate conference in Poland, known 
as ‘COP24’, a group of 415 investors, representing over 32 trillion US dollars, 
reaffirmed their full support for the Paris Agreement and undertook to improve 
climate-related financial reporting. They called on governments to put a price 
on carbon, abolish fossil fuel subsidies, and phase out thermal coal 
power.33
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The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund is taking steps to divest from coal, as 
are some private banks, including HSBC. A number of major multilateral de-
velopment banks, such as the World Bank, are no longer financing coal in-
vestment. Global insurance companies such as Allianz and AXA have 
announced that they will phase out insurance coverage for particular coal 
projects. 
Moreover, some of the world’s leading companies are moving to obtain all 
their electricity from renewable sources and encouraging their supply chains 
to do likewise. Both Apple and Microsoft recently announced that their facilities 
are completely powered by renewable energy. Many other companies, including 
IKEA, Tata Motors and Walmart, have committed to source 100% of their 
electricity consumption from renewables.34 
Major companies, including fossil fuel companies, now recognize the carbon 
risk to their operations.35 Under growing investor pressure, for example, Shell 
set out a plan to curb its net carbon footprint, including the emissions by its 
consumers, by around 20% by 2035.36 ExxonMobil, Equinor and other oil 
majors support the introduction of a carbon price.
VI. Public opinion
Public opinion is also a potent force for change. In countries across the world, 
consumers increasingly prefer to buy products and services that have a smaller 
carbon footprint, and civil society movements are applying pressure on 
governments and companies to reduce air pollution and carbon emissions. 
Religious leaders are adding to the moral arguments for acting on climate 
change. Pope Francis, for example, has endorsed phasing out fossil fuels in 
the encyclical Laudato Si′.37
Public opinion is not only being expressed through words but also through direct 
actions. Demonstrations against air pollution have taken place in numerous 
cities, from Beijing to London. Approximately 15,000 Australian school children 
took part in a school strike to demand action by their government against climate 
change.38 New social movements, such as Extinction Rebellion and the Sunrise 
Movement, are campaigning for radical action to tackle climate change.39 
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Litigation is on the rise too. A court in the Hague ordered the Dutch government 
to reduce the Netherlands’ greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels.40 Some of the world’s leading oil and gas 
companies are embroiled in legal disputes with cities, states and even children 
over the industry’s role in global warming.41 
As a result of these dynamic forces of change, the global energy transformation 
is gathering momentum and accelerating. 
Why renewables will transform  
geopolitics
The main story of the energy transition is the rise of renewables, particularly 
solar and wind, and the future decline of fossil fuels. Renewables differ in 
many respects from fossil fuels, and these differences will have geopolitical 
consequences.
First, renewable energy resources are available in one form or another in 
most countries, unlike fossil fuels which are concentrated in specific geo-
graphic locations. This reduces the importance of current energy choke points, 
such as the narrow channels on widely used sea routes that are critical to 
the global supply of oil.
Second, most renewables take the form of flows, whilst fossil fuels are stocks. 
Energy stocks can be stored, which is useful; but they can be used only once. 
In contrast, energy flows do not exhaust themselves and are harder to 
disrupt. 
Third, renewable energy sources can be deployed at almost any scale and 
lend themselves better to decentralized forms of energy production and 
consumption. This adds to the democratizing effects of renewable energy.
Fourth, renewable energy sources have nearly zero marginal costs, and some 
of them, like solar and wind, enjoy cost reductions of nearly 20% for every 
doubling of capacity.42 This enhances their ability to drive change but requires 
regulatory solutions to ensure stability and profitability in the power sector.
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The energy transformation will be one of the major elements that reshape 
geopolitics in the 21st century, alongside trends in demography, inequality, 
urbanization, technology, environmental sustainability, military capability, and 
domestic politics in major states.
Figure 2. World solar potential
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PA R T  2 . 
Redrawing the  
geopolitical map  
Power shifts
For two centuries, the geographic concentration of oil, natural gas and coal 
reserves has helped configure the international geopolitical landscape. Coal 
and steam power drove the Industrial Revolution which, in turn, shaped ge-
opolitics in the 19th century. Since then, control over the production of and 
trade in oil has been a key feature of 20th century power politics. A transition 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy could transform global power relations 
no less than the historical shifts from wood to coal and from coal to oil.
 
Repositioning of states
A state’s relative position in the international system is influenced by a range 
of attributes, including its GDP, population, land size, natural resources, ge-
ostrategic location, military resources, and ‘soft power’. Having control over 
and access to significant energy resources and markets is an important asset 
because it enables states to protect vital national interests at home, and 
leverage economic and political influence abroad. States without such assets, 
by comparison, have less leverage and are more vulnerable. 
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The rapid growth of renewable energy is therefore likely to alter the power 
and influence of some states and regions relative to others, and to redraw 
the geopolitical map in the 21st century.
How different countries fare in the context of the energy transition depends 
in no small part on how exposed they are to changes in fossil fuel trade flows. 
Equally important is their position in the clean energy race, the commercial 
race to become a leader in renewable energy technology. Although the issue 
is highly complex, innovation will be a key determinant of the pace of change 
and its effect can be illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Impact of the energy transition on selected countries  
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Figure 4. Impact of the energy transition
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• The Y-axis depicts the share of oil, gas, and coal imports in total primary 
energy consumption in 2017. It situates selected countries, as well as 
the European Union, in the energy economy of today, which is dominated 
by fossil fuels. The higher the share, the more dependent a country is on 
fossil fuel imports. Net fossil fuel exporting countries have negative shares.
A New World  28
• The X-axis shows the cumulative number of patents for renewable energy 
technologies that had been registered by the end of 2016. This indicator 
provides a way to assess the position of selected countries, and the 
European Union, in the clean energy race.
Countries and groupings in the upper right quadrant of Figure 4 stand to gain 
the most from the energy transition: they are highly dependent on imported 
fossil fuels but have positioned themselves at the forefront of the clean energy 
race.
Figure 4 gives rise to a number of observations.
• The United States is close to energy self-sufficiency, largely due to the 
shale revolution. It became a net exporter of natural gas in 2017 and is 
projected to become a net oil exporter early in the 2020s. The US is well 
positioned in the clean energy race: US companies hold strong positions 
in new technologies, including robotics, artificial intelligence, and electric 
vehicles.
• China will gain from the energy transformation in terms of energy security. 
It has a leading position in manufacturing, but also in innovation and 
deployment of renewable energy technologies. It is the biggest location 
for renewable energy investment, accounting for more than 45% of the 
global total in 2017.43 Currently, it remains highly dependent on oil imports 
which have been growing steadily.
• Europe and Japan are major economies which are very dependent on 
fossil fuel imports. They also hold strong positions in renewable technol-
ogies. In Europe, Germany leads the way with almost 31,000 renewable 
energy patents. Germany’s domestic Energiewende, or ‘energy transition’, 
has made the country a frontrunner in renewable energy deployment. 
• India has been among the fastest-growing economies in the world in the 
last few years, lifting millions out of poverty. It is projected to have the 
world’s largest population by 202444 and is poised to overtake China as 
the world’s largest energy growth market by the end of the 2020s.45 India 
has set itself an ambitious target of 175 GW of renewables by 2022.46 This 
represents a massive increase, considering that India’s total installed 
power generation capacity in October 2018 was only 346 GW.47
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• Russia, the world’s largest gas exporter and second largest oil exporter, 
may face challenges in adapting to a world increasingly powered by re-
newables. Russia’s economy is larger and more diversified than any of 
the Middle Eastern oil producers, but oil and gas rents are a vital component 
of the state budget, accounting for around 40% of fiscal revenues.48 Even 
though Russia is stepping up renewable energy deployment and is in-
vesting in research and development, it still lags far behind China and 
the US in terms of patents for renewable energy technologies. 
To assess the impact of the energy transition on different regions, Figure 5 
shows each region’s net fossil fuel exports and imports as a share of GDP.
Figure 5. Regional impact of the energy transition
Source: World Bank, IMF.
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While the graph above masks differences within regional groupings, it has 
the advantage of uncovering major differences between regions and country 
groupings.
• The Middle East and North Africa, together with Russia and other countries 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),49 are the regions most 
exposed to a reduction in fossil fuel revenues. On average, these regions 
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have net fossil fuel exports of more than a quarter of their GDP. Declining 
export revenues will adversely affect their economic growth prospects and 
national budgets. To prevent economic disruption, they will need to adapt 
their economies and reduce their dependence on fossil fuels. 
• The majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will benefit from 
reducing fossil fuel imports and generating renewable energy domestically, 
because this will boost job creation and economic growth. The exceptions 
to this are the two biggest oil producers in the region, Nigeria and Angola, 
which are at risk because they depend heavily on fossil fuel rents. Because 
of their size and large fossil fuel exports, they skew the data for SSA as 
a region. In the long-term, however, African countries have a unique 
opportunity to leapfrog the fossil fuel-centred development model despite 
recent discoveries of oil and gas. 
• Small Island Developing States (SIDS) will benefit most of all if they 
adopt renewable energy sources rather than fossil fuels. The import of 
fossil fuels now amounts to 8% of their GDP. Many SIDS are also extremely 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. SIDS possess ample renewable 
energy sources and renewable technologies can meet most of their do-
mestic energy needs. The shift would cut import bills, promote sustainable 
development, and increase their resilience. International cooperation to 
support SIDS’ renewable energy ambitions is growing substantially, and 
13 SIDS have established 60-100% renewable electricity targets.
• South Asia spends more than 3% of its GDP on imports of fossil fuels, 
and demand for fossil fuels is rising rapidly from a low base. These 
countries will benefit from the energy transformation primarily by reducing 
their fossil fuel import bills, which would otherwise grow dramatically 
and weigh on their economies.
• Europe, China and Japan are currently heavily reliant on fossil fuel imports 
but would increase their energy independence as renewable energy shares 
grow. Japan is the most dependent; its net fossil fuel imports amount to 
5% of GDP.
• North America and Latin America are net neutral when combined. On 
a continental scale, in light of both their domestic resources and interna-
tional trade in energy, their economies are largely energy independent.
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The vulnerability of fossil fuel exporters
Countries that have historically enjoyed geopolitical influence because they 
supply fossil fuels are likely to see a decline in their global reach and influence 
unless they can reinvent their economy for a new energy era. 
Many fossil fuel-rich countries are able to project considerable international 
power. They can employ their fossil fuel rents (the difference between cost 
of production and market price of fossil fuels) to finance socio-economic 
development and economic diversification, significantly strengthen their 
military capabilities, or invest in foreign assets such as US securities.
The energy transformation is expected to put pressure on fossil fuel prices 
and related rents.50 If fossil fuel revenues decline, these countries will need 
to rethink their national priorities and strategies. Figure 6 lists countries that 
derive much of their GDP from fossil fuel rents. 
Figure 6. Fossil fuel rents as a percentage of GDP (average 2007-16)
Source: World Bank.
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Figure 6 shows clearly that oil rents have generally been much larger than 
natural gas rents and coal rents. Among the countries whose fossil fuel rents 
amount to over 10% of GDP, natural gas rents are higher than oil rents in only 
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three: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Trinidad and Tobago. In just one country, 
Mongolia, coal rents are the highest fraction. In all other countries, including 
large gas exporters such as Russia, oil rents dominate.
A decline in fossil fuel rents has the potential to profoundly destabilize countries 
that have not prepared their economies sufficiently for the consequences. 
The loss of oil rents in countries with weak governance could lead to fractures 
in society and political instability. The drop in oil price in the 1980s was one 
of the factors that contributed to the decline and eventual fall of the Soviet 
Union, which in turn led to the end of the Cold War, arguably the biggest 
geopolitical shift since the end of the Second World War. 
Figure 7 shows fossil fuel exporters’ preparedness, based on exposure and 
resilience.51 Exposure captures the degree to which countries rely on rents 
from fossil fuels.52 Resilience measures income in relation to population in 
order to capture how robustly an economy can respond to the risks posed 
by the energy transition.53 
Figure 7. The relative preparedness of fossil fuel producing countries   
    for the energy transition 
Note. The chart includes countries in which fossil fuel rents account for more than 5% of GDP.
Source: IMF World economic outlook database April 2018, World Bank.
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Four groups of countries can be distinguished: 
• Highly exposed, low resilience countries 
These countries are highly dependent on fossil fuel rents, which typically 
account for more than 20% of their GDP. They also lack resilience because 
their per capita GDP is low and they have limited financial buffers. The 
countries in this group include Libya, Angola, Republic of Congo, Ti-
mor-Leste, and South Sudan. 
• Highly exposed, highly resilient countries
These countries are highly dependent on fossil fuel rents but have sufficient 
income and capacity to be able to reinvent themselves and adapt to the 
energy transition. They include Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Brunei Darussalam.
• Moderately exposed, moderately resilient countries 
These countries are quite exposed, but their economies are moderately 
resilient. As a result, they should be able to manage the transition, provided 
they implement effective policies to diversify their economies. This group 
includes Russia, Iran, Algeria and Azerbaijan. 
• Relatively low exposure countries 
Fossil fuel rents in these countries are less than 10% of GDP so they 
should be less vulnerable to the energy transition. This group includes 
Malaysia, Bahrain, Colombia and Norway. 
In many oil producing countries, there is an implicit social contract in which 
the authority of the state stems from providing generous subsidized services. 
If their oil income falls for a long period, these governments will struggle to 
provide the socio-economic programmes that citizens have come to expect. 
Austerity can potentially fracture the state’s legitimacy, possibly leading to 
social unrest, political infighting and even violence. In such cases, domestic 
political turmoil could spill across national borders with consequences for 
neighbouring states. Indeed, the emergence of a power vacuum in petrostates 
is potentially the biggest geopolitical risk of the energy transition.54
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Vulnerability is probably greatest in countries where the dependence on oil 
rents is highest and where there are high levels of youth unemployment. 
Recent upheavals in the Middle East indicate the formidable nature of the 
governance challenges in these states, which will become even more difficult 
to resolve as oil revenues decline. Nigeria is vulnerable in this regard as well. 
It has long struggled with poor governance and poverty, and now faces a 
youth bulge: the average age of the population is 18 years and the country is 
expected to overtake the United States to become the third-most populous 
country in the world by 2050.55 
The loss of oil rents may cause painful adjustments in the short term. In the 
long run, however, fossil fuel-driven economies have the opportunity to reduce 
the risks posed by oil dependence, and create a more stable, equitable and 
productive economic future for their peoples. Studies show that large oil rents 
can undermine growth, distort the economy, capture democratic institutions, 
stimulate corruption, impede the development of domestic industry, and 
aggravate conflict.56 While most of these adverse effects can be avoided 
through good governance, the rule of law and sound policies,57 they never-
theless remain a significant risk for many oil-rich states. 
Economic diversification to reduce dependence on oil rents has been a 
long-standing policy goal of many oil-exporting countries. The economic 
diversification and decarbonization strategy of the UAE, for example, shows 
how enlightened decision-making can reduce risks. The energy policy of the 
UAE foresees a 44% share of clean energy and 70% decarbonization of the 
economy by 2050. However, few countries have successfully invested their 
resource windfalls and constructed a strong and diversified economy. With 
the exception of Malaysia and the UAE, few oil exporters have followed 
Hartwick’s rule which states that, to preserve long-term per capita consump-
tion, subsoil assets (such as oil, gas and coal) should be transformed into 
reproducible surface assets (such as human or physical capital).58
In recent years, in recognition of the new reality, several oil exporting countries 
have developed plans to diversify their economies and increase their resilience 
(see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Diversification plans of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  
  countries
Year Country Plan
1995 Oman Oman 2020: Visions for Oman’s Economy
2008 Bahrain Economic Vision 2030
2008 Qatar Qatar National Vision 2030
2009 Kuwait State Vision Kuwait 2035
2010 UAE Vision 2021
2016 Saudi Arabia Saudi Vision 2030
2017 Kuwait New Vision 2035
Oil- and gas-rich states will derive many benefits from diversifying their 
economies. They will strengthen their long-term growth prospects and shield 
their economies from the vagaries of international commodity prices, a key 
source of macroeconomic volatility.59 An open economy and competitive 
private sector will generate more sustainable growth. They will also create 
more productive jobs, an important priority in countries where large numbers 
of young people are unemployed. Finally, diversification will help to prepare 
these countries for the looming peak in oil demand.
A tailored strategy is needed to create a secure path to economic transfor-
mation and diversification, particularly as each country has unique charac-
teristics and faces particular challenges which require specific solutions to 
resolve them. Policy interventions that encourage diversification include fiscal 
and monetary discipline, investment in human capital and infrastructure, and 
support for the private sector.60
Energy security for fossil fuel importers
On the eve of World War I, Winston Churchill made a daring choice: he 
converted the fuel used by the British fleet from domestic coal to imported 
oil. Ever since, energy security—the uninterrupted supply of energy at affordable 
prices—has been a critical strategic issue for all energy-importing states. No 
less than 80% of the world’s people live in countries that are net importers 
of fossil fuels.61
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Concerns over energy security have marked the conduct of international 
relations, the formation of alliances, the protection of national interests, and 
defence planning. Oil interests have shaped the relations between the 
United States and the Middle East for decades.62 Similarly, China’s need to 
secure oil supplies and other natural resources to sustain its growth has led 
it to foster new and deeper ties with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
as well as diversify its domestic energy supply with renewables. 
In a renewable energy economy, most countries will be able to achieve energy 
independence: they will have greater energy security and more freedom to 
take the energy decisions that suit them. Since some form of economically 
viable renewable energy potential is available in most places, countries that 
currently depend heavily on fossil fuel imports will be able to use renewables 
to reap strategic and economic benefits. 
In strategic terms, fossil fuel importing countries are vulnerable to risks of 
supply disruption and price volatility caused by political instability, terrorist 
attacks, or armed conflicts that may occur in oil- and gas-exporting nations. 
Smaller energy-importing countries may also be subject to pressure or coercion 
with regard to their energy supply and therefore have less freedom to determine 
their own strategic priorities and goals. 
By contrast, countries that are able to develop their own renewable sources 
of energy are better placed to achieve energy security. An example is the 
Brazilian ethanol programme which was put in place after the oil shock of 
1973 to reduce the country’s oil imports and shield the economy from volatile 
prices and supply disruptions. This programme has played a vital role in Brazil’s 
efforts to achieve energy self-sufficiency and has helped transform it into the 
world’s second largest producer and largest exporter of ethanol. 
In economic terms, a high degree of import dependence also generates costs 
and risks. Countries that import most of their energy are exposed to currency 
fluctuations and volatile fuel prices that can result in balance-of-payment 
problems. The oil price shocks in the 1970s, for example, squeezed many 
industrial economies and sowed the seeds of a debt crisis that many developing 
countries suffered in the decade that followed, with serious social and eco-
nomic consequences. Increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix 
can mitigate such risks and provide new pulses of economic growth. 
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Iceland is a good example of the benefits that can accrue from an economic 
transformation based on renewables. During the 20th century, it evolved from 
being one of Europe’s poorest countries, highly dependent on imported coal 
and oil, to a country with a high standard of living, which derives 100% of its 
electricity from hydro and geothermal energy.63 The effective development 
of its renewables has enabled Iceland to bolster its energy security, widen 
its economic base, and attract new industries to the country, including alu-
minium smelting, data storage and greenhouse agriculture.64
Fossil fuel imports can also impose a huge burden on the trade balance of 
some importing countries. Data from the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
indicate that in 2015, despite a significant drop in oil prices, the global cost 
of gross fossil fuel imports was 1.9 trillion US dollars.65 Figure 8 shows that 
Bahrain, India, Belarus, Jamaica, Tanzania, Pakistan, and South Korea were 
among the countries most dependent on fossil fuel imports. 
Figure 8. Share of fossil fuel imports in all merchandise imports  
    (average 2007-16)
Source: World Bank.
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Countries that switch from imported fossil fuels to domestically generated 
renewable energy will significantly improve their trade balance. India, for 
instance, is expected to overtake China as the largest growth market for 
energy in the 2020s. Its fossil fuel import bill (calculated as a proportion of 
total export earnings) grew from 35% in 2000-01 to 60% in 2012-13. Fossil 
fuel imports contributed to a trade deficit of 190 billion US dollars over the 
same period.66 
From the perspective of consumers, high energy import bills transfer large 
amounts of wealth abroad.67 Energy importers are vulnerable to price swings, 
often as a result of remote geopolitical events. High oil prices can also stifle 
economic growth by importing inflation, curbing consumer spending, and 
raising the cost of doing business. Lower oil prices, conversely, can help to 
stimulate an importer’s economy.68
Developing countries that lack domestic fuel reserves stand to benefit the 
most from exploiting their renewable energy resources. Small island developing 
states (SIDS), for example, rely heavily on imported fuels for their electricity 
needs.69 SIDS also sit on the frontline of climate change despite having done 
the least to cause it. To increase their resilience in the face of extreme weather 
events, as well as bolster their energy security and reduce prohibitive import 
bills, 13 SIDS including Cabo Verde, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Samoa, and Vanuatu, have announced plans to increase the 
contribution of renewable energy to between 60% and 100% of the power 
they consume.70
Achieving an electricity supply that is 100% renewable is technically feasible 
in places where diverse sources of renewables are available, and the variability 
of renewable electricity generation can be managed on the grid. Some 
countries, such as Albania, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Norway, Paraguay and Tajikistan, 
already obtain all or almost all of their electricity from hydropower, which is 
an established technology that provides stability in the transmission system. 
Others have achieved similar results using a mix of renewables. Brazil, 
Costa Rica, New Zealand and Kenya, for example, generate more than 80% 
of their electricity from a combination of hydro, geothermal, wind, biomass 
and solar power.71 
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Countries such as Chile, Jordan and Morocco are also reducing their depend-
ence on energy from abroad, in order to enhance their energy security and 
correct the structural trade imbalances that energy imports exacerbate. 
Morocco currently imports over 90% of the energy it consumes.72 It plans, 
however, to exploit its consistent sun and strong winds to reduce these imports 
and eventually become a net exporter of electricity to European and African 
markets. It has set a target of 52% renewables in its electricity mix by 2030.
Energy independence does not imply complete self-sufficiency or autarchy.73 
Even if a country is able to generate renewable energy, it will not necessarily 
choose to do so because it will focus on its comparative advantages. Even 
when a country’s energy needs are supplied entirely from home-grown sources, 
it will still benefit from international value chains and trade in technologies, 
goods and services.
Increasing energy security through renewable energy deployment may change 
the dynamics between energy exporters and importers. It will also diminish 
the role of oil and gas in international politics. Ensuring the security of energy 
supply becomes more a matter of domestic governance, rather than an in-
ternational security priority. Countries that achieve energy independence will 
also be less vulnerable or beholden to their suppliers and will therefore be 
able to pursue their strategic and foreign policy goals more independently. 
The rise of renewable energy leaders
Countries that are able to take advantage of new renewable energy technologies 
can expect to enhance their global influence and reach. Three types of countries 
have the potential to emerge as new renewable energy leaders.
First, countries with high technical potential for renewable energy generation 
stand to gain if they are able to become significant exporters of renewable 
electricity or fuels. Australia’s economically demonstrated solar and wind 
energy resources are estimated to be 75% greater than its combined coal, 
gas, oil and uranium resources.74 In the Atacama Desert, Chile has among 
the world’s best solar resources, as well as high potential for wind, hydropower, 
geothermal and ocean energy. In both cases, however, the remoteness of 
these locations will probably constrain electricity exports. 
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Some countries are already net exporters of electricity generated by renew-
ables. Brazil is already a major exporter of renewable electricity from hydro. 
Norway exports electricity to its neighbours and the Netherlands, and is 
building new transmission cables to Germany and the United Kingdom. Laos 
and Bhutan also export electricity generated from hydropower to neighbouring 
countries. Bhutan’s power exports to India raised more than 27% of government 
revenue and 14% of Bhutan’s GDP.75 
Second, mineral-rich countries such as Bolivia, Mongolia, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) have an opportunity to become part of the global 
production and value chains necessary for renewable technologies. Doing so 
will boost their economic development, provided they put the right policies 
and governance frameworks in place.
Third, leaders in technological innovation are positioned to gain the most 
from the global energy transformation. No country has put itself in a better 
position to become the world’s renewable energy superpower than China. 
In aggregate, it is now the world’s largest producer, exporter and installer of 
solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and electric vehicles, placing it at the 
forefront of the global energy transition. 
Figure 9 shows the total clean energy manufacturing value added by four 
technologies: wind turbine components, crystalline silicon PV modules, LED 
packages, and lithium-ion battery cells. It confirms that China is by far the 
largest global manufacturer of these clean energy technologies. In addition, 
it leads the world in renewable energy patents (see Figure 10). 
China’s concerted efforts to research, develop and invest in renewable energy 
and clean transport offer its industry the opportunity to overtake US and 
European companies, which have been dominant in sectors such as cars 
and energy machinery. This will give China a comparative advantage in trade 
and lend impetus to the country’s economic growth.
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Figure 9. Clean energy manufacturing value added (2014, US$ billion)
Source: Clean energy manufacturing analysis center.
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Figure 10. Cumulative share of renewable energy patents end 2016
Source: IRENA.
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By taking the lead on renewables, China has improved its geopolitical standing 
in several respects. By producing more of its own energy, China is reducing 
its reliance on fuel imports and the risks of energy disruption which could 
put a brake on its economic ambitions. Its technological expertise in renewables 
has established it as a leading exporter of clean energy technology, creating 
a balance of trade advantage.
The clean energy technology race could result in a situation of technology 
dominance. In some respects, that outcome can already be seen in mobile 
technology where a few companies (Huawei, Samsung, Apple) compete for 
global leadership. If a small number of players were to dominate clean energy 
technology in a similar way, it would raise concerns that concentration could 
stifle competition, suppress innovation, and distort markets. Countries that 
do not control key energy technologies may become heavily dependent on 
the few countries and companies that do. In this context, industrial policy 
becomes increasingly important; countries will need to create a competitive 
manufacturing value chain around certain technologies within a fair and 
rules-based trading system. 
Apart from the risk of technology dominance in specific areas, renewable energy 
leaders are unlikely to gain the degree of market dominance that fossil fuel 
leaders have enjoyed, due to the ubiquitous nature of renewable energy 
sources.
New actors: citizens, cities and corporations
The shift to renewable energy may reshuffle political and economic power, 
because renewables tend to decentralize and democratize energy systems. 
Due to the falling cost of solar PV and wind power, as well as smart distribution 
systems, almost anyone with a rooftop or some land can produce electricity, 
either for self-consumption or for the grid. These developments will generate 
a more diverse energy ecosystem. The role of the centralized state in the 
energy system may change, while many new actors and new business models 
are likely to emerge and flourish. Local and distributed forms of energy 
generation give households and communities more autonomy than centralized 
grid systems. 
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As more people install solar panels, batteries and smart software, formerly 
passive consumers of electricity may become consumers and producers of 
electricity in an interconnected grid. Innovation in market design and smart 
grid technologies, including storage, permit stable management of variable 
renewable electricity on the grid. Advances in communication technology 
may lead to the emergence of an ‘energy internet’, allowing hundreds of millions 
of people to produce electricity in their homes, offices and factories and share 
it peer-to-peer.77 The number of grid-connected smart devices is projected 
to rise from 26 billion in 2017 to over 75 billion by 2025, enabling intelligent 
demand side management.78 In this new world of ‘prosumers’, energy assets 
will no longer be owned exclusively by centralized utilities or the state. 
In a centralized energy system, the financial benefits of energy also tend to 
be centralized and concentrated in the hands of corporations and governments. 
A decentralized, renewable electricity system, by contrast, gives consumers 
a true choice of energy sources and a share in its economic benefits, while 
enhancing social acceptance of renewables investments. Germany provides 
a case in point. In 2016 private citizens owned 31.5% of installed renewable 
power capacity, making them the largest ‘bloc’ of investors in the sector.79
Decentralized renewables can also help to increase the resilience of local 
communities against environmental disasters. Higashi-Matsushima, a Japanese 
city affected by the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, chose to rebuild its 
energy infrastructure around microgrids and decentralized renewable energy. 
In the United States, microgrids became popular after Hurricane Sandy 
knocked out power for 8.5 million people in 21 states.80
Cities occupy a central role in the energy transformation. By the middle of 
this century, 70% of the world’s population is expected to live in cities.81 Cities 
consume around two-thirds of generated energy and produce 70% of the 
world’s carbon emissions. They are also especially vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change, including coastal flooding and urban heat island effects.82 
At the same time, they have the means to shape the new energy landscape. 
By 2030, the fifty largest cities will have a bigger economic footprint than 
many small- and medium-income countries, making them major economic 
and political players on the international stage in their own right. 
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Cities are already taking decisive action. In 2017, more than one hundred 
towns and cities were sourcing up to 70% of their electricity from renewables, 
compared to 42 in 2015.83 Several capital cities are among them, including 
Oslo (Norway), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Quito (Ecuador) and Wellington 
(New Zealand). Yokohama, Japan’s second largest city, is deploying a smart 
city project that has led to a roll out of smart grids, solar PV panels and electric 
vehicles.84 New megacities are being announced and built to run entirely on 
renewable electricity, such as Neom, which will be constructed near the Red 
Sea and Aqaba Gulf.85 
Cities and local municipalities are also forming global alliances and networks, 
including C40, ICLEI and the global covenant of mayors.86 Together with the 
actions of other non-state actors, such as California’s Global Climate Action 
Summit of September 2018, they are adding a new layer of global governance 
that is driving action to achieve decarbonization, sustainability, and greater 
resilience through renewables. 
There is ample evidence that private corporations are responding to the realities 
of the energy transformation by restructuring and adjusting, and increasing 
renewables generation. Following dramatic declines in market capitalization, 
Germany’s largest utility companies, RWE and E.ON, both split their businesses 
into two parts, one focused on renewables and the other on thermal generation. 
Danish Oil and Natural Gas (DONG) changed its name to Ørsted after selling 
off its oil and gas business. Total is diversifying into solar and battery technology. 
Shell is growing its natural gas portfolio relative to oil. BP and other oil com-
panies are buying into electric vehicle charging infrastructure. In 2017, barely 
seven years after its initial public offering, Tesla became the most valuable 
US car maker, overtaking General Motors, a company over one hundred years 
old. Some global technology companies already source 100% of their electricity 
from renewable energy.87 These trends indicate that global technology 
companies are becoming important players in the new energy landscape.
In short, the renewable energy transformation goes hand in hand with a 
dispersion of power. The modern nation state and the fossil fuel economy 
have evolved alongside one another. The decline of the fossil fuel era and the 
advent of decentralized power generation in an increasingly electrified world 
may have profound implications for the role of the nation state. 
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New relations between states
Renewable energy will not merely influence the balance of power between 
countries. It will also reconfigure alliances and trade flows, and create new 
interdependencies around electric grids and new commodities.
Shifting alliances
If global demand for fossil fuels declines, alliances built on fossil fuels are 
likely to weaken. Alliances may be maintained for various other reasons, but 
the energy pillar will become relatively less important.
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a prime 
example of a fossil fuel-based grouping. It was created in 1960 as a forum for 
oil-exporting countries to exchange information and coordinate their inter-
actions with the international oil companies that dominated international oil 
trading at the time. OPEC countries started to coordinate their oil production 
policies from the early 1980s.
OPEC has displayed enormous resilience to shocks, including a range of 
price crises and conflicts between and within member countries. The current 
cooperation between OPEC and non-OPEC countries, underpinned by the 
rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Russia despite their differing 
geopolitical priorities, can be understood as an attempt to sustain the organ-
ization in the face of rising US shale production. OPEC might reinvent itself 
in some guise; nevertheless, in a world that has a growing range of energy 
alternatives, it is likely to decline in importance.88 Qatar’s recent decision to 
leave, to focus more on export of natural gas, illustrates the challenge that 
OPEC faces amid rapid and structural changes in the market.
Bilateral relations between states will also undergo change. The alliance 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia is a prime example of a strategic 
relationship in which oil plays a key role. This alliance dates back to 1945, 
when King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt came 
to an understanding that the US would provide military assistance in exchange 
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for access to Saudi oil. Relations between the two states may evolve signifi-
cantly as economies across the globe become less dependent on oil.
Countries are also beginning to rethink their energy diplomacy. The foreign 
energy strategy of Japan no longer concentrates exclusively on securing fossil 
fuel imports but also includes renewables,89 hydrogen in particular.90 Germany 
spearheaded the creation of IRENA in 2009 and has developed bilateral energy 
partnerships with a number of countries in which renewable energy features 
prominently.91 The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a major oil-exporting country, 
has also assumed a leadership position on renewable energy by hosting 
IRENA, funding renewable energy projects in developing countries via the 
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development,92 and investing in renewable energy projects 
in developed countries.
Several new alliances and initiatives are emerging to promote multilateral 
cooperation and boost specific renewable technologies. The Paris 2015 climate 
conference alone gave birth to the International Solar Alliance,93 the Global 
Geothermal Alliance,94 and Mission Innovation.95 Initiated by governments or 
intergovernmental entities, these bodies bring together countries, private 
sector actors and non-governmental organizations to accelerate the adoption 
of renewables. 
While many of these alliances are at an early stage of development and focus 
on technological cooperation, they are likely to gain in geopolitical impact. 
At the launch of the first Assembly of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), 
India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, said that the “ISA will play the role of 
OPEC in the future”.96 While the ISA is still in its formative stage, India hopes 
to forge deeper trade and political ties with the developing world through 
solar diplomacy.97 
New geographies of trade 
Renewables will configure new geographies of connections and dependencies 
between countries and regions. In broad terms, the weight of energy depend-
ence will shift from global markets to regional grids. Countries that today 
import oil from the other side of the world will seek to develop renewables at 
home and to integrate their grids with those of neighbouring countries. 
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The transition to renewable energy will put electricity centre stage. Unlike oil 
and liquefied natural gas (LNG), which are traded globally, electricity is currently 
a regionally traded commodity. With current technology, much electricity is 
lost when it is transported over long distances. Global energy markets are 
therefore likely to become more regional. Innovations in ultra-high-voltage 
transmission that minimize losses could nevertheless help to enhance trade 
in electricity over longer distances. 
Trade in fossil fuels currently accounts for almost 15% of all merchandise trade.98 
If less fossil fuel is traded, more of the energy-related trade that persists will be 
in renewable energy technologies and electricity rather than fuels. Exceptions 
to this may include fuels such as hydrogen (generated both by renewables and 
conventional energy), synthetic fuels, and biomass (see Box 1). 
Unlike trade in fossil fuels, trade in renewable energy technologies would be 
shaped by ‘normal’ rather than ‘natural’ comparative advantages. A country 
has a natural comparative advantage when it has natural resources (such as 
oil fields) that are required to extract or produce a product. Since renewables 
are much less geographically concentrated, a country will specialize in those 
aspects of renewable energy trade in which it has a comparative advantage 
based on factors such as technology, relative price, and cost of transport.
As energy trade routes redraw themselves, the geopolitical map will take new 
forms. In a world in which energy can be produced at most locations, a single 
hegemon will be less able to exert influence by controlling the high seas or 
strategic chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz or Malacca. Some maritime 
trade routes will therefore become relatively less important.
Control over grid infrastructure will become vital for national security and for 
projecting global influence and power. Grid infrastructure includes physical 
assets such as power lines and storage facilities, and virtual interconnections 
that will multiply as the sector digitalizes. A country’s connectivity and networks 
may complement its land, sea and air power.99 
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B OX 1. HOW RENEWABLES CRE ATE NEW TR ADE PAT TERNS
The transition to renewable energy will create new trade patterns. While 
trade in fossil fuels will decline, trade in at least three other areas will 
grow:
1.  Trade in renewable energy-related goods and technologies. These 
include a wide range of goods and technologies, from solar PV panels 
to smart meters and batteries, as well as their components and parts 
(for example, blades for wind turbines or water wheels for hydropower) 
and related services (for example, engineering and installation 
services).
2.  Electricity trade will increase because additional interconnections 
make grids more stable and resilient. Variable renewables, such as 
solar and wind power, require flexible and interrelated power systems 
that can balance supply and demand in real time. Electricity inter-
connections can be made between neighbouring countries, at a 
regional scale and possibly even inter-continentally.
3.  Trade in renewable energy fuels may also grow significantly.100 An 
example is hydrogen formed by electrolysis in regions that possess 
an abundant supply of renewable energy, such as Patagonia or the 
Australian desert. Besides hydrogen, a host of synthetic fuels may 
also be generated from renewable electricity, including ammonia, 
methane and methanol. Such fuels permit seasonal storage of re-
newable electricity (which only pumped hydro has been able to do 
to date), and use existing infrastructure (such as natural gas pipelines). 
They also have the potential to reduce emissions in hard-to-electrify 
sectors such as aviation and some industrial processes.101 
While the potential to increase trade exists, the number of trade disputes 
related to renewable technologies has grown in recent years. Trade in 
renewable energy goods may be hampered by tariffs, discriminatory 
subsidies, and conflicting technical standards. Members of the WTO 
have started negotiations to open trade in environmental goods and 
services further. In the future, consideration will need to be given to 
governance issues, particularly standards and rules, to ensure a level-
playing field in renewable energy trade. 
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With projects in nearly 80 countries, China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) is 
a strategic global plan. Supported by over a trillion US dollars of dedicated 
financing over its lifetime, it is one of the world’s most ambitious infrastructure 
development programmes. The BRI aims to create a network of ports, railways, 
roads, pipelines and industrial parks that will link China to cities as far away 
as Bangkok and Rotterdam. No less bold is the ambition of State Grid, China’s 
largest state-owned company, to create a global supergrid called the ‘Global 
Energy Interconnection’ (GEI) that will link every continent with undersea 
transmission cables to power the world with green electricity.102
The BRI and the GEI have strategic objectives. China hopes to reduce its de-
pendence on energy and commodity imports that pass through chokepoints 
such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. China’s infrastructure 
diplomacy could be as important to 21st century geopolitics as the protection 
of sea lanes was to the hegemony of the United States in the 20th century. While 
the BRI has been embraced by many countries, it has also caused disquiet in 
some countries about China’s growing influence.103 Other concerns that have 
been expressed relate to indebtedness, transparency, the prominent role of 
Chinese contractors and the environmental sustainability of these projects.104
In recent years, other major countries have promoted their own infrastructure 
plans. Japan, the United States and India have advanced their ‘Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific’ strategies,105 under which the US will invest 113.5 million US 
dollars in infrastructure and connectivity projects. The countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have developed a strategy 
called ‘Connectivity 2025’,106 while the EU recently unveiled a ‘Strategy on 
Connecting Europe and Asia’.107
Given the range and ambition of these developments, infrastructure links and 
the internet may become new battlegrounds for influence and control between 
competing powers. They may also serve as a geopolitical glue, bringing nations 
and their citizens closer together in new interdependencies. To emerge and 
endure, a networked community needs a high degree of confidence and trust; 
but, once established, physical and human interconnections can become 
conduits for cooperation and coexistence, as well as stability and prosperity. 
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Rethinking energy statecraft
States have long used energy resources as instruments of foreign policy, a 
practice known as energy statecraft. In a world powered mostly by renewables, 
energy resources will lose much of their currency as geopolitical instruments. 
In the words of former US President Jimmy Carter: “No one can ever embargo 
the sun or interrupt its delivery to us”. At the same time, a reliance on other 
commodities, such as electricity, biofuels, emerging fuels like hydrogen, or 
critical materials, could create new forms of dependence and vulnerability. 
Oil and gas as foreign policy instruments
One possible consequence of the energy transformation will be to reduce 
the geostrategic importance of oil and gas as tools of foreign policy. On oc-
casion, countries have intervened in oil and gas markets to further their foreign 
policy goals.108 One way in which they have done this is through supply em-
bargoes. In October 1973, for example, member countries of the Organization 
of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) declared an oil embargo 
against some Western states in the wake of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Another 
example is the oil embargo against apartheid-era South Africa. 
Some countries have also put embargoes in place to leverage pressure on 
oil exporters. The US government’s re-imposition of oil sanctions against Iran, 
after President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, 
is a recent example. Some sanctions do not curtail a country’s current exports, 
because doing so would raise global prices and inflict equal pain on consuming 
countries. Instead, sanctions are targeted to hinder development of future 
production capacity. This approach underpinned the oil sanctions that Western 
states and Japan imposed on Russia in 2014.
Countries have sometimes tried to exert geopolitical influence, not by with-
holding supplies of oil and gas or by raising their price unilaterally, but by 
doing exactly the opposite. After oil prices fell dramatically in 2014, for instance, 
OPEC did not move to cut production because it preferred to maintain its 
market share in the face of growing US shale production.
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Oil and gas have not only been used as ‘sticks’ to hurt or deter foes, but also 
as ‘carrots’ to reward allies and ensure their allegiance. Venezuela’s Petrocaribe 
scheme, for example, granted large discounts on crude and oil product 
deliveries to small Caribbean states in an effort to counter US influence in 
the region. 
It is not just the energy resources themselves which have been the object of 
geopolitical competition, but also their transit routes. In the 1990s, for instance, 
the US promoted the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to bolster its strategic 
influence in the region at the expense of Russia and Iran. For more than a 
decade, the EU has supported the construction of a Southern Gas Corridor 
to reduce its reliance on Russian gas, while both Russia and some European 
countries have promoted alternative gas corridors, such as Nord Stream, to 
circumvent existing transit routes. 
Electricity cut-offs as a geopolitical weapon
The spread of renewable energy will increase electrification and stimulate 
cross-border trading in electricity. Variable renewable sources of electricity, 
including wind and solar, require flexible power systems that are able to cope 
with fluctuations of demand and supply in real time. Innovations in market 
design, smart grids, and storage technology, together with high-voltage direct 
current electricity interconnections between countries, can effectively meet 
this need for flexibility. 
Some argue that countries that dominate electricity grids may exercise undue 
control over their neighbours, and that inter-state electricity cut-offs will become 
an important foreign policy tool, applied strategically in the same way as oil 
and gas sanctions.109 
Notably, however, electricity trading tends to be more reciprocal than trade 
in oil and gas. Whereas oil and gas flow in one direction, from an exporter to 
an importer, the trade in electricity between countries flows both ways. A 
country that generates solar power may import energy from a neighbouring 
country when it rains, but export energy to that neighbour when the sun shines.
Unlike trade in natural gas, which requires a fixed transportation infrastructure 
such as pipelines or LNG terminals, the relationship between sellers and 
buyers of electricity is less exclusive. When Russia cut off gas supplies to 
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Ukraine in 2009, hitting consumers downstream in Europe, European states 
had limited access to substitutes for Russian gas. In the future, however, as 
more countries produce clean electricity and build interconnections, they 
are unlikely to be caught out by a boycott because they will be able to produce 
more electricity locally or to import it from a variety of alternative sources. 
Even if an exporter of renewable electricity acquires a dominant position with 
respect to an importing country, that asymmetry cannot easily be used as an 
instrument of geopolitical pressure. This is because countries will have al-
ternative options at their disposal: they can either produce the electricity 
themselves, for instance by deploying renewable energy at home, or import 
electricity from neighbouring countries.110 As a result, renewable energy 
exporters will always be part of a complex web of interdependencies between 
importers and exporters that would tend to curtail the potential to use renew-
able electricity as a geopolitical weapon.
An alternative view is that cross-border electricity trading will create oppor-
tunities for regional cooperation, and the creation of ‘grid communities’. Il-
lustrations of these include the Scandinavian countries, which have traded 
electricity between themselves for decades. Regional electricity pools are 
also being developed in Asia (the ASEAN power grid), Africa (five subregional 
power pools), Central America (SIEPAC111), and the Middle East (the Gulf 
Cooperation Council power grid). In recent years, several renewable energy 
supergrids have been proposed, including the Asia Super Grid, the Desertec 
project and the North Sea Offshore Grid.112
Lack of trust is a major impediment to creating cooperative grid connections 
between states. In order to build confidence during the Oslo peace process, 
a proposal to construct grid connections between Israel and its Arab neigh-
bours was put forward. These plans did not materialize because there was 
insufficient trust between the parties.113 Israel remains an ‘electricity island’ 
as a result. In another example, the Baltic states want to synchronize their 
grids with those of continental Europe in order to decouple their electricity 
systems from Russia, a move that has geopolitical motives.114
To govern cross-border grids, governments will need to develop appropriate 
arrangements to enable electricity to flow freely in well-regulated and 
transparent markets.115 Examples already exist. In Europe, the EU Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) helps to ensure that the single 
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European market in electricity functions properly. IRENA’s Clean Energy 
Corridors (CEC) initiative, which is incorporated in NEPAD’s Programme for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa, promotes cross-border trade in electricity 
across energy markets.116 The Continental Free Trade Area which is being 
developed in Africa also provides new opportunities for regional and sub-
regional integration and interconnections.
Biofuel trade risks
Biofuels have become important commodities in world markets, particularly 
since 2006, and are part of the energy transition strategy of some countries. 
Ethanol has been traded globally in significant volumes for decades. Biodiesel 
trade is less established and continues to consist primarily of trade in feed-
stocks (such as soya beans and vegetable oil) rather than fuel.117 Some 
concerns have been raised about the environmental impact of biofuels and 
the potential conflict between biofuels and food, but many countries are taking 
steps to address this, including through the development of next-generation 
biofuels based on crop residues or algae.
Despite these concerns, the characteristics of this market make it unlikely 
that trade in biofuels will be used as a geopolitical weapon: 
• Some feedstocks (such as sugar cane) are non-tradable or perishable.
• Only a small proportion of biofuels is traded internationally. 
• The biggest producers of biofuels are also the biggest consumers.
• Tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to hamper market access in a number 
of countries. 
• Sudden changes in crop yields or regulation can alter the direction and 
volume of trade flows.118
Bottlenecks in critical materials
Renewable technologies and batteries require certain minerals for their 
production, such as cobalt, lithium, and rare earth elements.119 Some fear 
that countries which have rich endowments in these critical minerals may 
use them to exert pressure on countries that lack them.
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This view was given credence in 2008 when China restricted the supply of 
rare earths to foreign buyers. Markets panicked and international prices soared, 
because China controlled a substantial part of the global supply of rare earth 
minerals. 
In fact, most of the 17 rare earth minerals are not geologically rare. They are 
abundant and widely distributed, though they are expensive and polluting to 
mine and produce. This is partly why the US has refrained from contesting 
Chinese predominance over rare earth production since the 1990s. 
Rare earths were perceived to be scarce partly because, like all commodity 
markets, rare earth markets are cyclical. When demand rises, supply takes 
time to respond because new mining projects have long lead times; the time 
lag causes prices to spike; high prices can lead companies to overinvest, so 
a boom is followed by a price collapse and a new cycle starts. This is exactly 
what happened in the wake of China’s export restriction: as prices rose, in-
vestment flowed into mining projects, leading prices to collapse in 2012.120
Furthermore, there are alternatives to the use of rare earths and other critical 
metals in renewable technologies. Efforts are being made to create cobalt-free 
batteries, and only a small minority of wind turbines (less than 2% in the US) 
are built with rare earth elements. Some minerals can also be recycled, re-used 
and stockpiled, thereby further reducing their perceived scarcity.121 
These factors combine to make it unlikely that cartels will emerge to control 
these critical materials. Cartels are hard to form and sustain. In the 20th 
century, oil was the only major commodity whose price did not fall in real 
terms, even though cartels were active in tin, coffee, sugar, and rubber. Inter-
national trade rules also impede cartelization. In 2014, the US, Japan and the 
European Union appealed to the WTO and successfully challenged China’s 
decision to restrict the export of rare earths.
In sum, the energy transformation driven by renewables will provide fewer 
instances of ‘energy statecraft’, the use of energy resources as an instrument 
of foreign policy. Electricity, biofuels and other materials critical to the new 
energy system are unlikely to acquire the geopolitical role and weight of oil 
and gas.
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Energy and conflict
The pivot to renewables could reduce the incidence of certain kinds of conflict, 
and alleviate competition for important natural resources, notably oil, gas, 
water, and food. On the other hand, cybersecurity and access to important 
minerals may generate increased concern and tension. 
Reduction in oil- and gas-related conflict
Fossil fuels, especially oil, have made a considerable imprint on patterns of 
conflict over the last hundred years. As the world shifts to renewables, and 
the relative importance of fossil fuels declines, a geopolitical shift in the in-
cidence and geographic location of conflict may occur. Global and local 
confrontations over contested hydrocarbon reserves, for example in the South 
China Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean, may diminish or result in fewer 
conflicts. To this extent, the global energy transformation may generate a 
peace dividend.122
Fossil fuels are rarely a direct cause of conflict between states, but they are 
often an aggravating factor in armed conflicts within states. Some African 
countries that produce oil have experienced serious internal turmoil and 
conflict in recent decades. Oil can reinforce existing inequalities and create 
opportunities for external actors to further exacerbate grievances in oil-pro-
ducing regions, particularly when central governments redistribute wealth 
away from them. Armed groups can also capture natural resources and related 
supply chains to finance their activities. Other natural resources (diamonds 
and tropical timber, for example) may also drive local conflict; however, the 
evidence links conflicts to oil more robustly than to any other natural 
resource.123
If oil and LNG become less strategic for security, maritime chokepoints—
narrow shipping lanes such as the straits of Hormuz or Malacca—may become 
less critical as a consequence (see Figure 11). The Strait of Hormuz is the 
world’s most important oil artery, which links Middle East crude producers 
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to key global markets. At its narrowest point, it is only 21 miles wide and the 
shipping lane is only 2 miles wide in either direction. Each day, around 30% 
of all seaborne traded crude oil passes through it, as well as a significant 
volume of LNG. There have been several military incidents in the Strait. In 
2018, Iran hinted it could disrupt oil flows through the Strait in response to 
the oil sanctions announced by the US.124
B OX 2. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE MILITARY
The global energy transformation could affect the way in which military 
operations and bases are run. In some countries, the military has blocked 
the deployment of wind turbines because they are alleged to interfere 
with radar surveillance. Yet militaries increasingly perceive renewables 
to be an opportunity. The US Department of Defense (DoD) is promoting 
energy resilience through energy efficiency, use of renewables, bat-
tery-storage, mini-grids and alternative fuels. The DoD has set a goal to 
produce or procure 25% of its total facility energy use from renewable 
sources by 2025.125 
The push into renewables is driven by defence and military requirements. 
The US military is one of the world’s largest consumers of oil. In 2017, 
it used over 85 million barrels of fuel to power ships, aircraft, aircraft 
carriers, combat vehicles, and contingency bases.126 This level of con-
sumption is costly and dangerous because fuel supply lines can be 
vulnerable to attack, especially in forward operations in combat zones. 
Even at home, US military bases are increasingly exposed to the threat 
of cyber attacks, as well as more frequent and extreme weather events 
due to climate change. In October 2018, Hurricane Michael devastated 
the Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida. 
The US DoD is not the only defence organization to explore the potential 
of renewables. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted 
its ‘Green Defence’ framework in February 2014. The militaries in 
countries including the United Kingdom and South Korea also plan to 
expand their use of renewable energy. 
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Figure 11. Daily transit volumes through world maritime oil chokepoints
Notes: All estimates in million barrels per day. Includes crude oil and petroleum liquids. 
Based on 2016 data.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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Cybersecurity
The energy transition is occurring alongside another revolutionary trend: 
digitalization. New digital technologies are transforming the energy sector 
by making it more connected, intelligent, efficient, reliable and sustainable. 
The electricity sector is at the heart of this process. As the contribution of 
variable and distributed energy sources grows, digitalization plays a key role 
in keeping grids balanced. It enables smart responses to electricity demand 
and blurs the distinction between generation and consumption. 
However, the growth of digitalization in the energy sector can raise security 
and privacy risks in the absence of an international rules-based framework. 
Criminal groups, terrorists, or the security services of hostile countries may 
hack into the digitalized systems that control utilities and grids, either for 
criminal purposes such as fraud and theft, or to commit military or industrial 
espionage. In the most extreme case, cyber attackers may attempt to interrupt, 
sabotage, or destroy industrial infrastructure, including the power supply. 
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The growth of the ‘internet of things’ (which allows users to connect household 
appliances, electric vehicles, communications equipment, and the energy 
infrastructure) provides additional entry points and targets for digital 
assault.
A case often cited is the December 2015 cyber attack against Western Ukraine’s 
power grid. Hackers were able to install malware on the computer systems 
in power distribution centres and take 30 substations offline, leaving more 
than 230,000 people in the dark for up to six hours. Considered the first of its 
kind, this incident highlights the risks of potential cyber attacks against 
electricity-based digital systems.127 
More recently, ‘national security’ justifications were invoked by authorities to 
prevent State Grid (the world’s largest utility company and China’s largest 
state-owned enterprise) from purchasing shares in certain electricity networks 
and utility companies, including in Australia (Ausgrid), Belgium (Eandis), and 
Germany (50Hertz). While the reasons were never fully elaborated, the assessed 
risks probably included a high threat of cyber espionage as well as unwilling-
ness to allow a third country to acquire partial control over critical national 
infrastructure. 
While the threat of cyber attacks is real, it should be placed in perspective.
Cybercrime is a risk that predates the energy transformation. Traditional 
electricity grids are also exposed to cyber intrusion, while other digital systems, 
such as banking and the internet, are equally vulnerable. In reality, everything 
connected to the internet is inherently vulnerable to hacking and cyber 
weapons. 
Although vulnerabilities and cyber risks will always exist and evolve, effective 
counter-measures can be developed and implemented to protect grids and 
related assets from attack. Grid providers around the world are already taking 
steps to prevent unauthorized access to energy systems. System operators 
have established standards to protect the grid, and companies are becoming 
more vigilant and developing contingency plans to protect against cyber 
attacks. New smart grid systems are being developed that prioritize cyber-
security in their design. To minimize the risk further, it would be prudent for 
the global community to take effective steps to develop common cybersecurity 
norms and rules. 
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Minerals
The widespread adoption of renewable energy and related technologies, such 
as solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and energy storage technol-
ogies, will increase the demand for a range of minerals and metals required 
for their production. (See Table 2.) 
In theory, the regions that possess substantial reserves of these minerals 
should benefit from the energy transformation. Latin America has huge reserves 
of copper, iron ore, silver, lithium, aluminium, nickel, manganese, and zinc. 
Africa is rich in platinum, manganese, bauxite, and chromium. In the Asia-Pacific 
region, China has metal reserves; India has iron ore, steel and titanium; In-
donesia, Malaysia and the Philippines possess bauxite and nickel; and New 
Caledonia has enormous reserves of nickel.128
Advances in prospecting and mining have also made it feasible to exploit 
minerals located under the seabed, raising thorny issues of sovereignty and 
governance.129 As deep sea mining expands, international norms and standards 
will be needed to mitigate the risks of environmental damage and conflict. 
However, the largest reserves of metals and minerals required for renewable 
technologies are found in weak states with poor governance records. More 
than 60% of the world’s cobalt supply originates in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC). Unaccountable external actors have sometimes caused 
or aggravated conditions that have maintained lawlessness and conflict in 
some of these mineral-rich regions, with devastating social, economic, political 
and environmental consequences. In Colombia, a country in which the 
longest-running internal armed conflict has taken place, various armed groups 
have controlled and exploited illegal tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold mining 
resources. 
Efforts have been made to address the issue of so-called conflict minerals. 
Most of these strategies attempt to increase transparency and accountability 
along the global supply chain. The OECD, for example, has published due 
diligence guidelines for companies that mine or trade in minerals130 and the 
UN Security Council has called for such measures to be applied in Cote 
d’Ivoire, the DRC, Sudan, and other conflict-affected states.131 Well-regulated 
and transparent exploitation of mineral deposits can make a major contribution 
to the economic development of these countries.
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Table 2. Minerals required for green energy technologies
Solar  
technology
Wind  
technology
Electric vehicles,  
energy storage
Bauxite and 
aluminium x x x
Cadmium x
Chromium x
Cobalt x x
Copper x x x
Gallium x
Germanium x
Graphite x
Indium x
Iron x x x
Lead x x x
Lithium x
Manganese x x
Molybdenum x
Nickel x x
Rare earths x x
Selenium x
Silicon x x
Silver x
Tellurium x
Tin x
Titanium x
Zinc x x
Source: IISD, Green Conflict Minerals, August 2018.

PA R T  3 . 
Addressing  
root causes  
of geopolitical 
instability  
The global energy transformation will affect social, economic and environmental 
factors that are often among the root causes of geopolitical instability and 
conflict. Climate change, rapid urbanization, high unemployment, discrimi-
nation, inequality and other major trends can create conditions that increase 
poverty and exclusion, promote the mass movement of people, cause violent 
conflict, and political extremism—all forces that have the potential to affect 
geopolitical stability. While the characteristics and rapid growth of renewables 
will generate new risks, the energy transformation will also create opportunities 
to overcome some of these challenges.
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Economic and social tensions
The energy transition involves a profound economic, industrial and societal 
transformation. It could affect prosperity, employment, and social organization 
as much as the first Industrial Revolution. The shift to renewables brings 
several macroeconomic advantages. For example, by 2050, the cost of energy 
could fall from 5% of global GDP to a little over 2% of a much larger world 
economy.132 However, it may also create new social divisions and financial 
risks that could reverberate through the international system and be geopo-
litically significant. 
Mitigating social dislocation
While the switch to renewable energy has the potential to create an additional 
eleven million jobs in the energy sector by 2050,133 it may at the same time 
reduce employment in specific sectors such as coal mining. The most la-
bour-intensive form of fossil fuel extraction, the coal sector employs a global 
workforce of at least 9 million people, more than half of whom are employed 
in China.134 Coal mining jobs are threatened by structural market forces in-
cluding cheaper alternatives and automation, and by government regulation 
to protect human health and the environment.
In China, the world’s largest coal producer, coal mining accounted for around 
5 million jobs in 2016, out of a work force of some 800 million.135 However, 
coal jobs are concentrated in particular regions and labour is the least mobile 
factor of production. Mine closures frequently have a deep and long-term 
impact on local communities and economies, causing marginalization, social 
dislocation, and disputes between workers and employers. 
The energy transformation may deepen existing political divisions or create 
new ones that in their turn create geopolitical consequences. Coal miners 
were among the most vocal supporters of Donald J. Trump during the 2016 
US Presidential elections; and recent cabinet changes in Australia and France 
can be linked directly to disagreements over the energy transition.136 In 2013, 
the Bulgarian government resigned amid a wave of violent protests over rising 
electricity prices, partly due to an overgenerous feed-in-tariff to renewables. 
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In China, protests against air pollution have spurred the government to make 
the fight against it a political priority.137 In many of the countries in which 
governments have attempted to phase out fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 
protesters have frequently taken to the streets to oppose such reforms.138 More 
than a quarter of a million French people protested in late 2018 against a rise 
in fuel prices tied to a new carbon tax.
There is some evidence that, while difficult to put into practice, policies that 
facilitate a ‘just transition’ can help to address the serious socio-economic 
difficulties faced by coalminers and their families and other communities of 
work whose skills are made redundant by new technologies.139 Measures 
that have been developed include the establishment of national or regional 
transition bodies, transition funds, on-the-job retraining programmes, infra-
structure investments, and programmes to develop skills, education, and assist 
with relocation.140 Spain recently provided an example of what can be achieved 
with enlightened leadership and progressive policies. The government came 
to an agreement with trade unions to shut down all coal mines by the end of 
2018, while investing 250 million Euros in affected mining regions over the 
next decade.
Stranded assets
The global fossil fuel system has a built asset value estimated at 25 trillion 
US dollars141 and continues to add one trillion dollars of assets each year.142 
A giant network of oil wells, coal fields, power stations, pipelines, oil tankers 
and refineries extends across the world. Yet no more than a quarter of total 
coal, oil, and gas reserves can be burned before the ‘well below 2oC’ target 
of the Paris Agreement is exceeded.143
Parts of the fossil fuel system could become ‘stranded assets’ as a result of 
policy action and the falling costs of renewable technologies. Asset stranding 
occurs when assets have suffered unanticipated or premature write-downs, 
devaluations or conversion to liabilities.144 IRENA has noted that electricity 
generated from renewables will become cheaper than electricity generated 
by new fossil fuel assets in all major locations by 2020.145 It is therefore only 
a matter of time in many parts of the world before green electricity becomes 
cheaper than electricity generated from existing assets, at which point it 
would make sense to close down fossil fuel generators.
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The process has already started. Since 2010, Europe’s electricity sector has 
already suffered impairments valued at more than 150 billion US dollars from 
write-downs of its thermal generating capacity.146 In the last five years, Engie 
has written off 35 billion Euros in fossil fuel assets.147 
The risk of stranded assets might not be fully reflected in the value of companies 
that extract, process or distribute fossil fuels. Moreover, these assets are 
counted when countries calculate their national resources. Were the risks to 
be priced in, the value of these companies, and the credit ratings of certain 
countries, could experience a sudden drop. This might have systemic con-
sequences, even trigger a climate ‘Minsky moment’,148 given the large sums 
involved. One study found that no less than 12 trillion US dollars of financial 
value could be lost in the form of stranded assets.149 To provide context, the 
Great Recession of 2008 was sparked by losses in the US subprime mortgage 
market of 0.25 trillion US dollars.
International bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board, are strongly en-
couraging firms to increase their disclosure of risks relating to climate change.150 
By September 2018, institutions with over 100 trillion US dollars of assets 
under management had declared their support for the recommendations of 
the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).
Climate, water and food security
Renewables will also induce geopolitical effects by mitigating climate change. 
Climate change will have widespread effects that defence and security experts 
call ‘threat multipliers’ because they can worsen scarcity of food and water, 
increase poverty, and aggravate risks of conflict and political instability. The 
UN Security Council has examined the impact of climate change on interna-
tional peace and security since 2007.
Climate change can threaten the stability of countries in a number of ways. 
It causes rainfall variability, droughts, floods, hurricanes and fires. Rising food 
prices and water shortages can result in political and social unrest. Sea level 
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rise is already threatening the survival and existence of many Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS). The destabilizing impacts of climate change can 
also lead to increased displacement and migration as people move to avoid 
extreme weather events or find water, food, land, jobs and a more secure life. 
These outcomes are already being felt in many countries, irrespective of their 
level of economic development or geopolitical standing. 
Accelerating climate change will increasingly exacerbate geopolitical com-
petition for water and food. Rapid economic and population growth are already 
increasing demand for those resources, especially in developing countries. 
By 2050, the demand for water and food is expected to rise by over 50%.151 
The interplay between water, energy and food supply systems—the nexus—
creates major geopolitical challenges for countries at a time of accelerating 
climate change. 
Hydropower is the world’s largest source of renewable electricity and has its 
own geopolitical dynamics, particularly when transboundary rivers and water 
resources are involved. These dynamics are increasingly impacted by climate 
change. The damming of major rivers, for example, will increase the energy 
security of upstream states that benefit, but could harm water supplies, ag-
ricultural productivity and fish stocks in states downstream, which may already 
be experiencing rising water stress. Planned dams along the Nile, Mekong, 
Tigris and Himalayan river systems could all have major impacts on water 
availability downstream and create tensions among riparian states as a result. 
There are also examples of hydropower benefits. The Itaipu dam enables 
Brazil and Paraguay to trade electricity and share water, so enhancing sub-re-
gional cooperation and stability. 
Renewable forms of energy can help to reduce water stress. Renewables 
require water withdrawals 200 times lower than conventional energy.152 One 
study has found that, by 2030, if they combine renewables with improved 
plant cooling technologies, Chinese power generation could reduce water 
intensity by as much as 42% and emissions intensity by up to 37%.153 Renewable 
energy technologies also offer increasingly attractive solutions to power 
desalination, a vital issue for many countries in arid regions, including the 
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
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Vulnerabilities in water and energy supply also pose critical risks for food 
security, since severe droughts and fluctuations in energy prices can affect 
the availability, affordability, accessibility, storage, and use of food over time. 
Integrating renewables in agriculture (through solar pumps for irrigation or 
geothermal energy for food drying) can improve agricultural yields, reduce 
post-harvest loss, and ultimately enhance food security.
Any significant increase in competition for food, water, land, clean air, and 
other resources essential for life can create social and economic tensions 
that could in turn have geopolitical consequences. These can increase tensions 
between states but may also foster new forms of cooperation to tackle these 
challenges collectively. 
A new development path
Social and economic tensions in a country can worsen if growth is not inclusive, 
services are captured by elites, or industrialization generates imbalances 
between regions. To achieve stability and prosperity over time, a country’s 
development needs to be inclusive and sustainable. In this sense, peace and 
development are two sides of the same coin. Both require policies and insti-
tutions to address environmental risks, reduce inequalities and ensure equity 
and social cohesion. 
Energy lies at the heart of human development. It is a critical factor in economic 
activity and essential for the provision of human needs, including adequate 
food, shelter and healthcare. Energy also fuels productive activities in the 
wider economy, including agriculture, industry and commerce. In the last 
twenty years, millions of people have gained access to electricity. Developing 
countries in Asia, led by China and India, have made significant progress. Yet 
to achieve universal energy access by 2030, as agreed in the SDGs, these 
efforts will need to accelerate. On current trends, about 674 million people, 
mainly in Africa, could still be without power in 2030.154
Historically, national electrification programmes have relied on large-scale, 
centralized power stations and line extensions powered by fossil fuels. Since 
around 2011, however, renewable energy has become an increasingly realistic 
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alternative due to the confluence of two major trends: falling costs and mobile 
banking. A quiet energy revolution is now underway, providing light and power 
to households and entrepreneurs via off-grid renewable energy systems (see 
Figure 12). Estimates suggest that off-grid solutions (standalone and mini-grids) 
could supply approximately 60% of the additional generation needed to achieve 
the goal of universal energy access by 2030.155
Figure 12. Population served by off-grid renewable energy solutions
Source: IRENA.
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Improving access to energy brings numerous benefits that are vital for human 
development and therefore helps to create the conditions necessary for 
geopolitical stability. Energy poverty is typically considered a development 
concern because, for both individuals and communities, it reduces the quality 
of life and opportunities. However, it also compromises security. It poses a 
direct threat to the many women and children who are daily at risk of injury 
and violence when they gather fuel. More broadly, it is a threat multiplier,156 
because it causes or exacerbates a wide range of problems, including poverty, 
marginalization, social unrest, population displacement, and environmental 
fragility. 
Renewables also offer developing economies an opportunity to leapfrog, not 
only fossil fuels, but, to some extent, the need for a centralized electricity grid. 
Countries in Africa and South Asia have a golden opportunity to avoid expensive 
fixed investments in fossil fuels and centralized grids by adopting mini-grids 
and decentralized solar and wind energy deployed off-grid—just as they 
jumped straight to mobile phones and obviated the need to lay expensive 
copper-wired telephone networks.
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Most importantly, renewables improve human welfare in ways that are not 
captured by GDP statistics. Properly designed, they can be applied to promote 
social justice and human welfare, encourage local empowerment and local 
wealth generation, contribute to a safer climate, improve public health, and 
advance gender equality and educational opportunities. The adoption of 
renewable energy will ease progress towards all 17 of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, not just the goal that relates to universal, affordable and 
clean energy.157


Conclusion  
This Report argues that the global energy transformation driven by renewables 
will have significant geopolitical implications. It will reshape relations between 
states and lead to fundamental structural changes in economies and society. 
The world that will emerge from the renewable energy transition will be very 
different from the one that was built on a foundation of fossil fuels.
Global power structures and arrangements will change in many ways and 
the dynamics of relationships within states will also be transformed. Power 
will become more decentralized and diffused. The influence of some states, 
such as China, will grow because they have invested heavily in renewable 
technologies and built up their capacity to take advantage of the opportunities 
they create. By contrast, states that rely heavily on fossil fuel exports and do 
not adapt to the energy transition will face risks and lose influence.
The supply of energy will no longer be the domain of a small number of states, 
since the majority of countries will have the potential to achieve energy in-
dependence, enhancing their development and security as a result.
While the precise scope and pace of the energy transformation cannot be 
predicted, its impact on countries, communities and companies will be 
profound.
The transition will generate considerable benefits and opportunities. It will 
strengthen the energy security and energy independence of most countries; 
promote prosperity and job creation; improve food and water security; and 
enhance sustainability and equity. Some states will be able to leapfrog 
technologies based on fossil fuels. The number of energy-related conflicts 
is likely to fall.
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Countries must prepare for the changes ahead and develop strategies to 
enhance the prospects of a smooth transition. At the same time, the energy 
transformation will generate new challenges. Fossil fuel-exporting countries 
may face instability if they do not reinvent themselves for a new energy age; 
a rapid shift away from fossil fuels could create a financial shock with significant 
consequences for the global economy; workers and communities who depend 
on fossil fuels may be hit adversely; and risks may emerge with regard to 
cybersecurity and new dependencies on certain minerals. 
Despite difficulties, the energy transformation will ultimately move the world 
in the right direction by addressing climate change, combating pollution, and 
promoting prosperity and sustainable development.
As the world gets ready for the geopolitical consequences of the energy 
transformation, this Report can provide leaders of governments, business 
and all sectors of society with a foundation for dialogue and debate, thereby 
contributing to policy development and new courses of action.
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